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Heredity and Hope: The Case for Genetic Screening.
By Ruth Schwartz Cowan. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008.
Pp. 292. $27.95.
Since Crick and Watson discovered the DNA sequence in 1953 the genetic
enterprise has gained increasing momentum to include the mapping of an
individual’s entire genome and the construction of entire populations’ ge-
netic data collections. The hope is that overall human mortality and mor-
bidity can be improved by unlocking the secrets of our genetic codes, which
contribute to the health that we and our kin enjoy. By understanding the
mechanisms and determinants of genetic inheritance, one can predict the
predilection of an individual or a group to inherit diseases that have a genet-
ic component. Essentially, this is a rationale for genetic screening and test-
ing. Screen-ing is more often directed at the population level and may in-
clude carrier and adult screening, whereas genetic testing refers to a host of
techniques focused more on the individual level such as prenatal diagnosis
and newborn screening, but the terms are often used interchangeably.
Genetics both as a scientific technology and a medical system is thought
by some to have a dark past, a history associated with eugenics (ironically
meaning “the beautiful inheritance”), whose early proponents hoped to
“improve the race” through ethically dubious practices such as involuntary
sterilization and restrictions on reproduction. Yet Ruth Schwartz Cowan in
her book Heredity and Hope persuasively argues that one should not make a
“genealogical fallacy” by confusing the motives of the founding fathers of
medical genetics with the motives of the early eugenicists. The former had
motives that were applaudable—to alleviate human suffering; the motives of
the latter were condemnable because they sought to elevate certain subsec-
tions of the human race over others.Hence, Cowan asks opponents of today’s
genetic screening not to make the mistake of assuming that the genetic tech-
niques and procedures now offered to pregnant women are an extension of
the eugenics movement as was practiced in the early twentieth century.
Heredity and Hope is separated into several parts. Cowan begins in the
early twentieth century with a detailed account of the eugenics movement
in the United States, Germany, and Scandinavia, where eugenicists had
some influence on public policy. Then she outlines how the eugenics move-
ment related to medical geneticists working at the same time, before mov-
ing on to discuss the history of prenatal diagnosis and adult screening,
focusing on specific conditions that were developed after the 1960s: new-
born screening for phenylketonuria (PKU), fetal testing for Tay-Sachs dis-
ease, carrier screening for sickle-cell anemia, and finally mandated adult
screening for thalassemia in Cyprus.
The detail of Cowan’s analysis and historical exposition is second to
none, and rarely is such a heated and controversial topic dealt with in such
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a clear and forthright way. Although I was a little unsure about why Cowan
focused on these disorders in particular, I take the point that Tay-Sachs
screening was successful because it was supported at the grassroots, whereas
sickle-cell anemia screening failed because of opposition from the black
community. This led me to wonder if there was a further point about pub-
lic support and opposition for genetic screening that was being made. Per-
haps if Cowan had focused on other single-gene disorders this would have
been instructive and added to her argument. Cowan also makes the point
that genetic screening, particularly prenatal diagnosis, opens up choice; that
is, parents can choose to have a healthy child rather than not to have a child
at all. Yet we know from recent studies in the United States that some par-
ents simply refuse to have genetic tests—they choose not to choose.
Cowan offers very good arguments that we should not object to genetic
screening because of its (loose) association with eugenics. Further, her
book undoubtedly fills a void by providing a much-needed historical over-
view of the evolution of genetics. Such a void perhaps reflects a general lack
of interest, awareness, or willingness by social scientists to engage with the
eugenic past. They should read this book. You should read this book. Love
it or hate it; either way this book should not be ignored.
GILL HADDOW
Gill Haddow is senior research fellow and lecturer at the Economic and Social Research Coun-
cil, INNOGEN Centre, University of Edinburgh.
16_51.2bkrevs 490–542:12_50.1bkrevs 202–  4/15/10  4:34 PM  Page 533
